Youth justice reform: redressing age discrimination against children? by Flacks, S. & Flacks, S.
  
 
WestminsterResearch 
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/research/westminsterresearch 
 
 
Youth Justice Reform: Redressing Age Discrimination against 
Children? 
 
Simon Flacks 
 
 
University of Vienna (Westminster Law School, University of Westminster)  
  
 
 
This is the author’s accepted version of an article published in Youth Justice 
(April 2012), 12:1, 19-35, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azt066  
 
The published version is available at:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azt066 
 
 
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster 
aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience.  
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
1 
 
 
Youth justice reform: redressing age discrimination against children? 
 
Simon Flacks 
 
Correspondence: Simon Flacks, University of Vienna, Doctoral College ‘Empowerment 
through Human Rights, Hörlgasse 6, 1090 Vienna, Austria.  
E-mail: simon.flacks@univie.ac.at  
 
Abstract 
 
This article considers whether the system of reprimands and final warnings in the youth 
justice system in England and Wales constitutes age discrimination for the purposes of 
human rights law. Whilst much youth justice discourse has addressed the use of diversionary 
measures that steer children away from formal justice processes, little attention has been paid 
to measures which negatively discriminate against children, in comparison to adults, without 
reasonable justification. The discussion contextualises the issue within discourses on the 
sociology of childhood and youth justice, and considers why there is a general reluctance to 
recognise children as ‘victims’ of age discrimination. 
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Introduction 
After gaining power in the May 2010 parliamentary elections, the new British government, 
like many before it, wasted little time in signaling its commitment to review sentencing and 
rehabilitation policy in the criminal justice system and, in December 2010, published the 
Green Paper Breaking the cycle: effective punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing of 
offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2010). The government’s response to the ensuing consultation 
outlined plans to “replace the current youth out-of-court disposals with a system of youth 
cautions, and youth conditional cautions, repeal youth penalty notices for disorder and 
promote informal restorative disposals” (Ministry of Justice, 2011: 9). 
This article considers whether current out-of-court disposals, in particular reprimands and 
final warnings, discriminate against children. Age discrimination in respect of young people 
is an issue almost entirely neglected in both youth justice and child rights discourse.1 
Although diversionary measures that treat children more leniently than adults – measures 
which one might describe as positive discrimination - are now enshrined in international soft 
                                                          
1 In this article, both ‘children’ and ‘young people’ refers to people under the age of 18. 
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law, and have formed the basis of a number of critical commentaries on the juvenile justice 
system in England and Wales and elsewhere, (see, for example, Kilkelly, 2008; Goldson and 
Muncie, 2009; Harmmarberg, 2009) there has been very little scrutiny of laws which may 
constitute negative discrimination on the basis of age. Where discussion has focused on the 
issue of discrimination specifically, it has mostly addressed unequal treatment among 
children and young people within the criminal justice system, in particular on the basis of 
gender and ‘race’ (Youth Justice Board, 2004), but not children and young people per se.  
 
The right to non-discrimination is a well-established, if sometimes ill-defined, principle of 
human rights law. The relevant provisions, and their application, are discussed in more detail 
later in the article, but they include Article 14 of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Various legal authorities, including 
UK courts, have held that age falls within the purview of such human rights provisions.2 The 
discussion that follows is particularly pertinent because there have been increasing moves 
towards recognising age discrimination in legal provisions across Europe, for example in the 
Directive establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and 
Occupation ((2000) OJ L 303/16). However, the discourse has been dominated by 
discrimination as experienced by older people, particularly in respect of employment, and not 
by children and young people.3 Indeed, as explained later, children have been expressly 
excluded from civil age discrimination legislation in the UK.  
 
This article begins by arguing that the use of reprimands and final warnings constitutes age 
discrimination, and considers the feasibility of bringing a case under European and domestic 
human rights law. It then discusses the importance of socio-legal understandings of 
childhood, discrimination and youth justice in arguing for greater recognition of the 
propensity towards age discrimination in the criminal justice system in general, 
notwithstanding the challenges such an approach holds. Although not blind to the limits of 
                                                          
2 See, for example, R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions (interested party), High Court, 26 July 2004, EWHC 1797. 
3 This may to a large extent be a result of the dearth of children’s voices in public discourse, and the (related) 
dominance of ‘protection’ or ‘in need’ organisations among children’s charities and representative bodies. In 
contrast, older people’s organisations are represented and staffed by older people themselves, and are more 
rights focused. For example, the website for Age UK, the largest charity representing the rights of older people, 
deems age discrimination important enough to address on its homepage: http://www.ageuk.org.uk/. In contrast, 
the Child Rights Alliance for England (CRAE) which is dwarfed in size by the vast majority of children’s 
organisations in the UK, is the only such organisation to expressly refer to age discrimination on its website: 
www.crae.org.uk.   
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non-discrimination law in addressing social inequality, it concludes by arguing that 
scrutinising criminal justice policies with age discrimination in mind could constitute a useful 
means for challenging overly punitive youth justice measures, and that viewing childhood as 
a site of potential discrimination on the basis of age, could prove helpful in addressing young 
people’s marginalisation.     
 
Reprimands and final warnings: examples of age discrimination? 
 
Section 65 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) introduced reprimands and final 
warnings into the youth justice system, and these are among the provisions that the 
government has recently indicated it plans to replace. These measures were introduced 
because of perceptions that the previous ‘caution’ system was too soft on juvenile offenders, 
and that it allowed too much scope for the repetition of offending behaviour without the 
juvenile being suitably sanctioned (Bateman 2002). Following a reprimand, any further 
offence leads to a final warning or charge. Final warnings are issued when an offender has 
previously been handed one caution or reprimand, or has not received either but the gravity of 
the offence is deemed to warrant a more serious intervention. A young offender will normally 
receive only one final warning unless two years have elapsed since the imposition of the 
initial warning (CDA, s.65). As such, the final warning scheme restricts the number of times 
young people can be diverted from court and “creates a clear presumption in favour of 
prosecuting a young offender who has previously been reprimanded and warned” (Koffman 
and Dingwall 2007: not page numbered). In the previous system of cautioning, there was less 
of an emphasis on, and requirement to engage in, rehabilitative and compulsory measures in 
order to avoid prosecution. Indeed, the CDA places statutory obligations on the police and 
Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) to provide, or assist in providing, rehabilitative 
interventions at the final warning stage (Fox et al., 2006). Following automatic referral, the 
YOT conducts an assessment of the ‘risk’ that the young person poses to themselves and the 
public at large using an ‘Asset’ – a standard tool which involves scoring the young person 
according to various identified ‘risk’ categories. According to Koffman and Dingwall: “A 
problem with the new presumption that a young offender will be considered for a 
rehabilitative programme is that this will frequently be too severe a consequence for a 
relatively minor offence” (2007: not page numbered). 
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Reprimands and Warnings are recorded on the Police National Computer, remaining there for 
five years, and form part of a criminal record. They are also included in both standard and 
enhanced criminal record searches (Release, 2010). Moreover, they are also cited in court 
hearings when a young person appears on a charge, while compliance or non-compliance 
with a final warning programme is included in YOT court reports (Fox et al., 2006). If a child 
commits a further offence within two years of a final warning, he or she is prevented from 
receiving a conditional discharge. Lady Hale, in the House of Lords case of R v Durham 
Police and another, ex parte R ([2005] UKHL 2) (the Durham Constabulary case), 
emphasised that “reprimands and final warnings do carry consequences… they amount to a 
considerable modification of the child’s legal status” (paragraph 45). Liberty, a human rights 
organisation, has argued that such a “two-step system” is: 
 
 “inflexible and unjust. It tie[s] the hands of police officers, preventing them from 
making reasoned judgments on a case-by-case basis about how best to deal with young 
people with whom they [come] into contact. It act[s] as a funnel, channelling young 
people into the criminal justice system and removing the option of informal 
intervention as a way of tackling low-level offending” (Liberty, 2009: 3).  
 
Alongside these criticisms, there are two means by which age discrimination arguments may 
be invoked. First, adults are subject to warnings for which there are less punitive 
consequences. Say two people were stopped in different geographical locations, one aged 17 
and one aged 18, twice in the same period for unrelated low-level offenses, such as minor 
vandalism and then cannabis possession. It is most likely that the 18-year-old would be 
handed a (adult) caution on each occasion (Home Office, 2008), whilst the 17-year-old would 
be issued with a reprimand (ACPO, 2009). But while it is likely that the adult would be sent 
on her way with the second warning simply recorded on a police database, the police officer 
would be compelled to issue the youth with either a final warning or a charge – with all the 
ensuing legal consequences.4 In other words, the same offences, under the same 
circumstances for two people with comparable recent arrest histories, would likely result in 
harsher treatment for the 17-year-old compared with the 18-year-old. This raises questions 
                                                          
4 In fact, guidance issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers on dealing with those detained for 
possession cannabis for personal use considers what an officer should do if a 17-year-old and a 19 year-old are 
smoking cannabis together. The guidance says: “Officers may have to deal with them differently i.e Arrest one 
(17 years) and warn the other (19 years)” (ACPO, 2009: 11).  
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under, for example, article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as implemented 
in the UK via the Human Rights Act 1998.   
 
Second, it has already been argued that the final warning process violates the right to due 
process since the accused do not have to consent to the warning,5 and are unable to contest 
the evidence (Gillespie, 2005). In contrast, adults must give informed consent in order for a 
caution to be issued (Home Office, 2008). Such a difference in treatment, it is suggested, 
amounts to age discrimination and this second argument will be addressed before returning to 
the first, more general proposition, that the use of reprimands and final warnings is itself 
discriminatory. 
 
The feasibility of a claim under article 14 
 
In the Durham Constabulary case, a challenge to the legality of the consent issue was 
rejected by the House of Lords, and it is submitted that a discrimination claim could also 
have been brought under article 14. A 15 year old boy was given a reprimand for behaving in 
a sexually inappropriate manner towards girls at his school. However, he was not informed 
that, under Part 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997, a reprimand required his listing on a sex 
offenders’ register. R claimed that the procedure breached Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the right to a fair trial). The House of Lords rejected the claim, 
with Lord Bingham questioning whether Article 6 was invoked at any stage during the 
process, but particularly arguing that, even if engaged at the beginning, it ceased to be of 
relevance once the police decided not to prosecute because there was no longer a criminal 
charge (paragraph 12). Gillespie (2005) has persuasively rejected this argument, noting that 
the administration of a reprimand has considerable legal effects for the offender, and thereby 
constitutes a criminal charge that will be included on his/her criminal record and, in this case, 
on the sexual offences register. Moreover, he notes that the power to issue the reprimand 
without reference to the Crown Prosecution Service leads to the possibility that it may be 
imposed in circumstances where the evidence could be insufficient. Gillespie further notes 
that an admission of guilt is necessary for the issue of a reprimand, yet the scope and 
substance of an admission is not clear (Evans and Puech, 2001; Gillespie, 2005). Finally, and 
most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, in respect of consent, Gillespie refers to 
                                                          
5 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is silent on the issue of consent for reprimands. 
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the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (Article 40(3)(b)) and 
Rule 11.3 of United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (the Beijing Rules) that require the consent of the juvenile or her or his parents to any 
“diversion involving referral to appropriate community or other services”. Gillespie 
concludes: “Accordingly Lady Hale could, and should, have decided that the right to a fair 
trial includes a consideration of the UNCRC and ruled that diversion from formal criminal 
procedures without consent infringes the right to fair trial through a denial of due process” 
(2005: 1014). 
 
Besides the arguments concerning the right to fair trial, it is feasible that a discrimination 
claim on the grounds of age, under article 14 of the European Convention, could have been 
lodged in conjunction with Article 6 since, for the equivalent charge (a caution), informed 
consent may be required for adults but not for children. Article 14 is violated when a State 
Party treats persons in analogous situations differently without providing objective and 
reasonable justification; or when, without objective and reasonable justification, it fails to 
treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different (Thlimmenos v. Greece 
(2001) 31 EHRR 15). It is pertinent to note, and this is also important in respect of the 
possibility for claiming that the existence of a different and more punitive system for 
juveniles may in itself be discriminatory (discussed further below), that Article 14 is not an 
independent equality right. It only gives protection from discrimination in relation to the 
enjoyment of the other rights in the Convention. As such, a discrimination claim will only be 
considered under Article 14 if any difference of treatment falls within the scope of another 
Convention right. As indicated earlier, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
held that ‘age’ is included among ‘other status’ under Article 14 (ECtHR, Schwizgebel v. 
Switzerland (No. 25762/07), 10 June 2010). Protocol 12 to the Convention, which introduces 
a substantive equality clause into the Convention, and which was opened for signature in 
November 2000, can be invoked independently of other Convention rights – unlike article 14 
– but it has not been ratified by the UK.  
However, it is arguable that a claim under Article 14 could nonetheless have theoretically 
succeeded in the Durham Constabulary case. If the Court holds that a substantive right has 
been violated, it will often not go on to consider the grounds for discrimination under Article 
14 if this involves scrutinising what is, essentially, the same complaint. But the Court has also 
held that it may examine claims under Article 14 taken in conjunction with a substantive 
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right, even if there has been no violation of the substantive right itself.6 This raises the 
possibility that, even if there was held to be no violation of Article 6, a claim under article 14 
might nevertheless be considered by the Court. 
Moreover, the Court has decided cases where there has been an imputation of age 
discrimination in the context of children and crime. In T. v. UK and V. v. UK (ECtHR, T. v. 
UK [GC] (No. 24724/94), 16 December 1999; V. v. UK [GC] (No. 24888/94), 16 December 
1999) two boys - who had been found guilty of a murder committed when they were 10 years 
old  - argued that they had not been given a fair trial because their age and lack of maturity 
meant they could not participate “effectively” in their defence; again a right guaranteed under 
Article 6 of the Convention. The Court held that a State must take “full account of [the 
child’s] age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities” and take steps “to 
promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings” (Fundamental Rights 
Agency, 2011: 103). It concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6, although it did 
not expressly examine the case from the perspective of Article 14. In D.G. v. Ireland and 
Bouamar v. Belgium (ECtHR, D.G. v. Ireland (No. 39474/98), 16 May 2002; ECtHR, 
Bouamar v. Belgium (No. 9106/80), 29 February 1988) the applicants had been placed in 
detention, which the Court ruled amounted to arbitrary detention. The applicants had also 
claimed that the treatment was discriminatory because national law dictated that adults could 
not be deprived of their liberty in such circumstances. The Court concluded that there had 
been no violation of Article 14 in respect of the alleged difference in treatment, but it did not 
dismiss the claim. It instead held that the justification test for discrimination under Article 14 
failed.  
 
The justification test 
 
Beyond the feasibility of bringing an age discrimination claim, the ‘reasonable and objective’ 
justification test would also need to be passed. This test follows the seminal ruling on 
proportionality in the context of discrimination and Article 14 at the ECtHR in  the Court, in 
the Belgian Linguistic Cases, (Nos. 1 & 2), ((No.1) (1967), Series A, No.5 (1979-80) 1 
EHRR 241 (No.2) (1968), Series A, No.6 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252). The Court held: “A 
difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no reasonable justification: that is if it does 
not pursue a legitimate aim, or there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC] (No. 31871/96), ECtHR 8 July 2003. 
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between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized” (paragraph 33).  
 
Fredman (2003) observes that human rights treaties use “open-ended notions of equality,” 
which require the courts to “create principles for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate 
instance[s] of unequal treatment” (2003: 59). A means test is thus deployed to differentiate 
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of discrimination. If the differential treatment is 
proportionate, “the court must be satisfied that there is no other means of achieving that aim 
that imposes less of an interference with the right to equal treatment. In other words, the 
disadvantage suffered must be the minimum possible level of harm needed to achieve the aim 
sought” and that “the aim to be achieved is important enough to justify this level of 
interference” (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2011: 45). 
 
In D.G. v. Ireland and Bouamar v. Belgium, the Court ruled that, even if there was a 
difference in treatment between adults and children, such measures would be justified. 
According to the judgment: 
 
“...even assuming that there would be a difference in treatment between minors 
requiring containment and education and adults with the same requirements, any such 
difference in treatment would not be discriminatory stemming as it does from the 
protective regime which is applied through the courts to minors in the applicant's 
position. In the Court's view, there is accordingly an objective and reasonable 
justification for any such difference of treatment...” 
 
The important question, then, is how far does such a ‘protective regime’ go? To what extent 
can this justify measures that may have been instigated in the name of protection, but that 
result in harsher, harmful penalties for juveniles? Are the regimes of reprimands and final 
warnings, and the differential attribution of due process for adults and under-18s, ‘objective 
and reasonable’?  
 
Assuming Gillespie (2005) is correct in his assertion that the reprimand does amount to a 
criminal charge, the denial of a right to a fair trial for children arrested on minor drug charges 
should not be considered proportionate. A challenge to the assertion of a legitimate aim 
usually fails, since “it is only rarely that measures are completely irrational, and it is always 
possible to argue that they are suitable and necessary to accomplish a legitimate aim.” As 
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such, the proportionality test is invariably reduced to “measuring the relative intensity of the 
interference with the importance of the aim sought” (Tsakyrakis, 2009: 468). In this case, the 
government might, for example, argue that differential treatment is necessary because the 
purpose of the reprimand system is to divert young people from court, and the requirement of 
consent may impede the swift disbursement of such action. Or perhaps law makers were 
simply concerned about issues of consent and capacity in respect of children and young 
people, and how to ensure that the given consent is legally valid. It is of limited use to 
examine the force of speculative arguments, but it is submitted that the importance of this 
aim, and the availability of less restrictive measures (depending on the arguments for the 
discriminatory measure put forward) such as, for example, police guidance on ensuring 
consent given by juveniles is informed, would not justify such a serious interference. Once 
again, we can only speculate, but swift justice and avoiding legal complications in issues of 
consent are hardly good grounds for discriminatory treatment. The Court has in the past 
emphasised the “prominent place” of the corollary right, Article 6, within a democratic 
society, and has advocated an expansive interpretation of the provision.7 It has, furthermore, 
taken the view that any suggestion that children should not benefit from the fair trial 
guarantees of Article 6 is “unacceptable.”8 
 
As discussed earlier, although it may be reasonable to argue that the system of reprimands 
and final warnings is itself discriminatory - because it restricts the number of times juveniles 
can be diverted from court, in contrast to the system applied to adults - such a claim could not 
be brought independently in either domestic or European courts because Article 14 is to be 
used only in conjunction with the alleged interference of another right (notwithstanding the 
creative way in which the Court has interpreted this, discussed above). Sandra Fredman 
(2002), among others, has argued persuasively that the UK should ratify Protocol 12, 
providing for an independent equality right, but given the coalition government’s antipathy 
towards human rights in general, it is unlikely that this will occur for some time, if at all.9 
However, it is instructive to consider whether the justification test would be passed were 
Protocol 12 to be ratified it in the future – and this may be of particular relevance for other 
                                                          
7 Delcourt v. Belgium, 17 January 1970, para. 25. 
8 Nortier v. the Netherlands, Commission Report 9 July 1992, Appl. No. 13924/88, para. 60. 
9 The Conservatives had wanted to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 with a UK Bill of Rights, and largely 
rejected a European Court of Human Rights ruling on giving prisoners the vote in February 2011. See, for 
example, David Cameron: UK human rights law review 'imminent', BBC news online, 16 Feb 2011, at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12482442. 
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European States that have already ratified. It would, in such circumstances, not be difficult to 
argue that there was a legitimate aim. The State might would probably argue, for example, 
that the ‘diversionary’ measures (discussed further below) were devised in order to intervene 
early and, ideally, rehabilitate. But would such measures be proportionate, given the 
consequences for the criminal records of children and young people and the dangers of being 
‘inducted’ into the criminal justice system? After all, although the goal of reprimands and 
final warnings may be to intervene at an early stage to interrupt a young person’s potential 
‘criminal career’, and to divert them away from court, research has in fact linked  ‘labelling’ 
to the entrenchment of ‘criminal careers’. Koffman and Dingwall, for example, note: “It is 
believed that the majority of young offenders will attain greater maturity eventually and 
outgrow their law-breaking, if they are not adversely ‘labelled’ and confirmed in their 
criminal identities” (2007: not page numbered). Evidence from a confidential survey where 
young people self-reported their offending showed that once young people had been warned 
or charged they were much more likely to be arrested again than those who committed 
similar offences, but were still unknown to the police (McAra and McVie, 2005). Barry 
Goldson (2011) has noted, moreover, that theoretical critiques of intervention in youth justice 
are informed by interactionist, social reaction and labelling perspectives that question the 
common sense assumption that early intervention serves to offset future offending. Although 
the system of reprimands and warnings may have been devised in order to divert juveniles 
from court, if such as system works to their detriment, criminalising and labeling children and 
young people for offences for which adults would be diverted entirely from court, then it 
constitutes discriminatory treatment which has no reasonable justification. Of course, it may 
be difficult to determine the effect of perhaps well-meaning - even if misguided - youth 
justice measures in advance, but this example demonstrates the importance of research that 
scrutinises all the social and personal consequences of seemingly welcome, commonsensical 
‘diversionary’ measures. 
 
Returning once again to the feasibility, rather than the substance, of such cases, success at the 
European Court in practice would not be easy given the political context in which cases are 
assessed. States have been afforded a considerable degree of discretion in developing policies 
and practices based on national cultures and traditions, reflecting anxiety over too much 
interference with Member State sovereignty. The Court has developed the doctrine of the 
‘margin of appreciation’, which indicates the extent to which the State has discretion in 
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determining whether differential treatment is justified within its borders. In this way, the 
Court is:  
 
“less likely to accept differential treatment where this relates to matters considered to 
be at the core of personal dignity – such as discrimination based on race or ethnic 
origin, home, or private and family life – and more likely to accept differential 
treatment where this relates to broader social policy considerations, particularly where 
these have fiscal implications.” (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2011: 45). 
 
But this does not preclude the argument that such claims have merit, and that considering 
youth justice provisions in the context of age discrimination could prove useful, whether in 
court or in campaigning for legal reform.10  
 
 
The exclusion of children from civil discrimination legislation 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that age discrimination has barely featured in youth justice 
discourse. Discriminatory youth justice provisions are enacted within a broader social context 
in which children in the UK experience considerable marginalisation, and yet are afforded no 
protection from age discrimination outside of the criminal sphere. The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has voiced its concern at the:  
 
“general climate of intolerance and negative public attitudes towards children, 
especially adolescents, which appears to exist in the State party, including in the media, 
and may be often the underlying cause of further infringements of their rights” (CRC, 
2008: 6).  
 
                                                          
10 It is worth noting that some might fear that adults could themselves launch claims for discrimination on the 
basis that children are dealt with more leniently through diversionary measures. But it would not be difficult to 
justify such measures on the basis that children’s evolving capacities and possible diminished decision-making 
capability, as well as the desire to avert criminally labeling and so one, would render such differential treatment 
reasonable and proportionate.  
 
12 
 
The report went on to identify a means for going some way towards redressing such negative 
and stigmatising attitudes:  
 
“The Committee welcomes the State party’s plans to consolidate and strengthen 
equality legislation, with clear opportunities to mainstream children’s right to non-
discrimination into the UK anti-discrimination law (forthcoming Equality Bill)” (ibid). 
 
But UK children’s rights advocates, as well as a clutch of parliamentarians, were dismayed in 
2009 by the refusal of the UK government to legislate for discrimination against children in 
the draft Equality Bill as identified by the Committee, despite lobbying from national legal 
and child rights experts. Among other purposes, an aim of the Bill was to extend age 
discrimination protection beyond the workplace, to cover the provision of goods, facilities 
and services – yet the resultant Act does not apply to persons below the age of 18 in this 
respect (Equality Act 2010, s. 28(1)(a)). Harriet Harman, the Leader of the House of 
Commons at the time, told MPs: ''The provisions will not cover people under 18. It is right to 
treat children and young people differently... and there is little evidence of harmful age 
discrimination against young people.''11 Yet submissions to the consultation that preceded the 
enactment of the Bill suggested otherwise.  
 
A report by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), comprising representatives 
from both the House of Commons and House of Lords, argued that: 
 
“the total absence of protection against age discrimination for those under 18 in service 
provision… means that children who are subject to unjustified discrimination are left 
with little or no legal protection” (JCHR, 2009: 23).  
 
An organisation, Young Equals, set up to specifically campaign for protection from age 
discrimination for children and young people, and composed of organisations including 
Liberty and Save the Children, launched a publication called, Making the Case, including a 
                                                          
11 Davies C. ‘Discrimination “a fact of life for British children”’, The Guardian, 29 March 2009 
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dossier of evidence of age discrimination against children and young people (Young Equals, 
2009). The report notes:  
 
“Research reveals a pattern of behaviour under which older children, usually (but not 
solely) aged 16 and 17, receive less favourable treatment from health services than 
adults or younger children, either due to a complete lack of services or to a lack of age-
appropriate service provision.” (Young Equals, 2009: 8). 
 
A government inspectors’ report concluded that ‘young people aged 16–18 with a mental 
health condition or a chronic illness’ received ‘insufficient priority’ by children’s health and 
social care services (Ofsted, 2005: 7). Young Equals also cited reports from the government 
Social Exclusion Unit and the British Medical Association, with the former concluding that:  
 
“‘age boundaries’ between services have a particularly negative impact on children 
(especially those who are most disadvantaged). The report found ‘little consistency or 
continuity’ between services and few mental health services dealing with children aged 
16 and above, so that ‘some …find that at 17 they are having difficulty getting any 
mental health support at all’. Substance misuse services for older children are found to 
be ‘under resourced and marginalised’.”  
 
The latter, meanwhile, “criticised a lack of mental health services for adolescents and poorly 
developed services for teenagers in need of treatment for smoking, drinking and drug 
addiction” (Young Equals, 2009: 8). 
 
However, in response, the government Equality Office claimed that:  
 
“The vast majority of examples submitted as evidence would already be covered by 
existing human rights legislation, existing domestic discrimination legislation or more 
thoroughly dealt with through public sector duties.... it is almost always right to treat 
children of different ages in a way which is appropriate to their particular stage of 
development. Any such legislation would require a large number of exceptions to 
ensure, for example, that a child of a particular age could not insist on the same 
treatment as an older (or younger) child or adult, or an adult claim the same treatment 
as a child” (UK Government Equalities Office, 2010: 25).  
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The government also stated that it was concerned that “certain age-based services for children 
could be withdrawn by service providers in the mistaken belief that they were no longer 
lawful; or the law might be used as a convenient excuse to withdraw services that would have 
been withdrawn anyway” (ibid.).  
 
But it is rather difficult to believe that service providers working in the interest of their clients 
would withdraw services without consulting professionals with knowledge of the Equality 
Bill’s implications. If they did, they would discover that the Equality Act introduces a 
justification test, which states that the service provider has a defence if it can show its 
conduct is a 'proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim' (s.13(2)). A parallel test in 
the context of European law was discussed earlier, and it would be possible to show that the 
provider could only provide services to a certain age group because of, say, the specific needs 
of that group and limited resources to cater to all ages. Indeed, the justification clause would 
neglect the need for “a large number of exceptions”, which would presumably not need to be 
invoked any more than for older people. Furthermore, existing human rights legislation is not 
currently protecting young people - in respect of the examples submitted - any more than it is 
protecting older people.  
 
Socio-political barriers to recognising age discrimination for children 
 
The sociology of childhood has been the focus of substantial scholarship, particularly over 
the last 30 or so years, and it is bound up with variable understandings of children’s rights, 
and with approaches to youth justice. Until this time, “[t]he limited way in which mainstream 
sociology looked at children had shaped a research agenda which was primarily concerned 
with questions of why children fail to become the right kind of adult” (Moran-Ellis, 
2010:187). In this conceptual framework, children are essentially different from, and by 
definition set up in opposition to, adults. Various authors have since called for, and engaged 
in, research that concerns children as social actors, and not merely objects of study, or future 
adults (see, for example Alderson, 2000; Lansdown, 1995). Politically, children have 
historically been the subject of scrutiny, viewed invariably as either - and/or both - vulnerable 
innocents in need of protection and/or potentially deviant beings requiring surveillance and 
15 
 
control (see, for example, Goldson, 2004; Piper, 2005; James and Prout, 1997; Moran-Ellis, 
2010) According to Rose “childhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal 
existence” (1989: 121).  
 
Discrimination sits uneasily with images of childhood in which children as objects are 
depicted as either innocent and vulnerable (‘needing’ welfare), or dangerous and criminal 
(‘needing’ discipline and ‘deserving’ punishment) (Goldson, 2000). An understanding of 
children as agency-bearing rights-holders challenges romanticised, idealised, or pathological 
notions of childhood. The fact that, in England and Wales children are deemed criminally 
responsible at the age of 10, but cannot enjoy protection from age discrimination at any age, 
is indicative of an attitude to children that affords them specific variants of active agency 
when conceptualized as ‘threats’, but denies them similar levels of agency when they are 
deemed to constitute ‘victims’. In this sense, children must be protected and cosseted, but 
asserting power (either when offending or claiming parity) threatens the adult-child 
relationship and hence the social order.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious example of invidious and yet broadly condoned discrimination 
against children is the continued state-endorsed deployment of corporal punishment in the 
home. The prevailing view on ‘smacking’ is that low-level violence may be in the best 
interests of the child, or dispersed for the child’s ‘own good’.12 All adults have the right to be 
free from physical assault under the criminal law, yet domestic law allows children to be 
‘reasonably chastised’,13 although the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the 
existence of this defence violates Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the child’s right to be protected from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. Michael 
Freeman (1996: 100) argues that: “Nothing is a clearer statement of the position that children 
occupy in society, nor a clearer badge of childhood, than the fact that children are the only 
members of society who can be hit with impunity” . Fredman (2003: 35) has framed the 
refusal of successive governments to outlaw the corporal punishment of children in the home, 
which is “difficult to reconcile with the rights of children and young people to physical 
integrity and liberty,” within the context of age discrimination, although the European Court 
of Human Rights did not address issues under Article 14 when it has made rulings on such 
                                                          
12 See, for example, Martin D. (2010) Young children who are smacked ‘go on to be more successful. Daily 
Mail, 4 January 2010, accessible at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1240279/Children-smacked-
young-likely-successful-study-finds.html  
13 See Children and Young Person’s Act 1933 s.1(7) and, for the reasonableness test, H [2002] 1 Cr App R 59. 
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claims.14 Correspondingly, criminologists in the fields of youth justice were historically 
preoccupied with the question of how and why boys “do crime”. Richard Collier (1998: 72) 
writes that the “association between boys, young men and crime has itself been rendered 
inseparable from the interrelated histories of the criminal justice system, penal policy and 
criminological theory” .  
In this socio-political context, arguing for the recognition of age discrimination in youth 
justice policy, never mind civil law, presents formidable challenges. Recent domestic policy 
does not support international consensus on children’s rights in youth justice, and both 
reproduces and reflects these social constructions of childhood. It is a generally accepted 
principle of the criminal law, as well as youth justice policy, that children and young people 
should be afforded more lenient treatment by virtue of their diminished age and maturity.15 
‘Diversion’, which denotes the measures deployed to prevent the processing of offenders 
through formal criminal justice processes like prosecution, trial and sentence, has been 
commonly supported as a means for dealing with juvenile offenders when the offences are 
considered to be minor.16 The Beijing Rules invoke this principle in Rule 11, and the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly emphasised its importance.  
Non child-specific international legal instruments also include clauses designed to protect 
children within the criminal justice system. Thus Article 6, paragraph 5, of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits the death sentence from being imposed on 
persons below 18 years of age and article 10, paragraph 3, requires the separation of juvenile 
offenders from adults (Human Rights Committee, 1994: para. 8). The Beijing Rules also 
stipulate in section 5 that: “The juvenile justice system shall emphasise the well-being of the 
juvenile and shall ensure that any reaction to juvenile offenders shall always be in proportion 
to the circumstances of both the offenders and the offence.”  
                                                          
14 See, for example, the case of A. v. UK (100/1997/884/1096) 
15 For example, Lord Bingham, in R v Durham Police and another, ex parte R [2005] UKHL 2, 373, noted that: 
“[It] has long been recognised as undesirable in many cases for young offenders to be drawn into the process of 
the criminal courts...unless this is really necessary.” Cited in Dingwall and Koffman (2006: 488). 
16‘Diversion’ itself has been critiqued on the basis that, in spite of its ubiquity, its meaning is ill-defined. 
Dingwall and Harding argue that: ““Diversion” may be an appropriate description of what happens to those 
offenders for whom there is a conscious decision not to use the formal process of prosecution and trial in cases 
where there is a fair expectation that it would otherwise have taken place. But it is less properly applied to 
convey the idea of what happens to those offenders who are customarily and as a matter of principle dealt with 
outside the conventional parameters of formal criminal justice, for instance by non-State agencies or by non-
repressive procedures and measures. “Diversion” begs the question of the norm: from what is the offender being 
diverted?” (1998:1). 
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But much academic analysis has scrutinised the last UK Labour government’s preoccupation 
with youth criminality, and its distancing from international rights consensus, because, it is 
argued, of its efforts to avoid being seen as lenient on juvenile crime  (see, for example, 
Koffman and Dingwall, 2006, Kemshall, 2008, Kelly, 2001, Goldson, 2000, Muncie, 2006, 
Scraton and Haydon, 2002). It is often asserted that the number of children in custody in 
England and Wales has climbed to the highest in Europe (Goldson 2005). Section 37(1) of 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 states that the principal aim of the youth justice system is to 
prevent offending, including reoffending, by children and young people. The Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act 2008 (CJIA) reinforces this principle. While the welfare of the offender, 
and other factors, must be taken into consideration, these must be subordinate to the principal 
aim of youth justice – to prevent offending and reoffending.  In this way, Arthur (2008: 1117) 
argues that the “welfare of the child is unavoidably degraded from its historically secured 
place as the paramount consideration to a marginal concern” . Indeed, the CDA 1998 as a 
whole has been described as “punitive and controlling in principle and in practice,” and 
providing a framework in which crime control takes precedence over due process (Puech and 
Evans 2001: 804). The apparent primacy of the reoffending principle reflects the dominant 
discourse on childhood and criminality in England and Wales, portraying childhood as a 
period of ‘dangerous tendencies’ which must be curtailed in order to produce socially 
acceptable adults (Collier 1998). 
These comments are reflected in the admonishments of the United Nations Committee 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which in 2008 stated that: “the principle of the best 
interests of the child is still not reflected as a primary consideration in all legislative and 
policy matters affecting children, especially in the area of juvenile justice, immigration 
and freedom of movement and peaceful assembly” (CRC, 2008: paragraph 26). Youth 
justice policy in England and Wales, as in many other countries, also falls hardest on 
those from the poorest and most marginalised backgrounds. Goldson (2010: 164) 
writes: 
 
 “[e]xcessive reliance on youth justice systems to ‘manage’ profound contradictions in 
the social order is shown to be both ethically unsustainable and practically counter-
productive. On the one hand it amounts to the criminalisation of social need and the 
intensification of social injustice. On the other hand, as noted, it is a spectacularly 
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ineffective strategy when measured in terms of crime prevention and community safety 
and it often serves to exacerbate the very problems that it ostensibly aims to resolve.”  
 
The fact that age discrimination is such a marginal issue is perhaps not surprising given this 
wider policy context. Moreover, a further impediment to recognising age discrimination, and 
indeed an impediment to bringing children’s rights claims in general, is the limited number of 
children who are able or willing to challenge discriminatory measures both inside and outside 
of court, and the apparent shortage of lawyers who may be willing to take on such cases. It is 
particularly difficult to imagine that many children, particularly when those most at risk of 
discriminatory criminal treatment are likely to come from disadvantaged backgrounds - 
further diminishing their economic, social and political capital - would conceive of 
themselves as ‘rights-holders’ and therefore deserving of redress.  
 
The question of whether the discriminatory treatment of children is justified in certain 
circumstances would likely be highly contentious. There are situations in which children 
must be granted preferential, and therefore differential, treatment for their benefit. Indeed, 
this is, as discussed earlier, the rationale for ‘diversionary’ measures. Furthermore, few would 
disagree with the principle that children should, say, benefit from extra safeguards against 
sexual exploitation because of their specific vulnerability in respect of capacity and consent. 
On the other hand, when does different treatment unjustifiably interfere with a child’s rights? 
Fredman (2003: 33) writes that:  
 
“The use of age as an approximation of capacity for children and young people raises 
different issues from those of older people, since decision-making capacity is 
developing. A difficult and challenging balance needs to be struck between 
independence and participation on the one hand, and protection of the child’s interests 
on the other”. 
 
 
There are no easy answers to this broader dilemma, and there are considerable challenges to 
recognising children as victims of age discrimination, but it has been argued here that this 
balance has not been struck in respect of some out-of-court youth justice disposals currently 
in place in England and Wales. While it is a given that children should be afforded some 
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protection by virtue of their diminished responsibility and capacity, it is time to pay closer 
attention to the ways in which they experience negative discrimination on the basis of age, 
and the extent to which this is legitimised simply because of their status as children. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As well as the socio-political barriers to the recognition of children as victims of age 
discrimination, critical legal scholars have questioned attempts to seek social, political or 
economic parity via the law. Nancy Fraser (1995), for example, insists that affirmative 
solutions that recognise rights or identity claims fail to transform underlying inequalities 
because they are predicated on subordination to the (for our purposes, intrinsically ageist) 
statutory framework. On the other hand, she argues, truly transformative solutions must in 
same way overcome or destabilise existing structures. Nonetheless, given how young people 
have been increasingly problematised and criminalised in the UK, despite increasing 
recognition of the rights of children and young people, framing punitive and repressive 
policies within the context of age discrimination could prove fruitful for challenging harmful 
youth justice policies. The erroneous claim that young people commit more crime than adults 
should certainly not be deployed as reason for punitive youth justice policies any more than 
any other marginalised social groups. In addition to the implications for law and policy, it is 
hoped this discussion might prompt further theoretical investigation and empirical research 
into the issue. ‘Anti-social’ behaviour measures, also the subject of a review (Home Office, 
2011), police stop and search practices and the use of dispersal orders against children are 
ripe for analysis, while theoretical approaches might consider the implications for identity 
politics and legal theory addressing responsibility. While the UK government has signaled its 
intention to replace the current system of discriminatory measures, it is important to consider 
whether and how the proposed new system of cautions, or indeed other youth justice 
measures and practices, discriminate on the basis of age. 
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